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Disclaimer	  
•  The	  views	  presented	  in	  this	  talk	  are	  those	  of	  
the	  speaker	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  
views	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  
Defense.	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What is Hardware Security? 
•  Many of the issues of hardware security are similar to 
traditional computer security 
–  Malware, authentication, program analysis, patches, insiders, 
social engineering, developmental attacks, evaluation, 
certification and accreditation, flawed implementations, 
protocols, system-level issues, network security, usability, 
economic incentives, complexity. 
•  Anything can be hacked, but the attacker has finite resources.  
–  Shades of grey rather than black-and-white (“broken” or not) 
–  Make attackers toil, and design systems that “win” decisively 
–  Each security technique has its advantages and disadvantages, 
and we must understand each technique's limitations. Even 
crypto has limitations. We need to know what specific attacks 
each technique is capable of preventing.  
What is Hardware Security? 
•  Opportunities of hardware 
–  High performance 
•  Custom processors for crypto, deep packet inspection, 
etc. 
–  Direct control 
–  No intermediate OS layers 
–  Physical separation 
•  Challenges 
–  Semantic gap 
–  Engineering and fabrication costs 
What is Hardware Security? 
•  Foundry Trust 
–  Malicious Hardware (a.k.a. “gate-ware”) 
•  Trojan Horse, Rootkit, Kill Switch 
–  Design Theft (Protecting Intellectual Property) 
–  Start with a secure design before addressing fabrication security 
•  Operational Attacks 
–  Power Analysis, Fault Injection, Heating, Optical 
–  Cold Boot, Probing, Math Errors 
•  Developmental Attacks 
–  Malicious Design Tools 
–  Malicious IP 
•  System Assurance 
–  Security Architecture, Key Management, PUFs 
–  Formal analysis of IP cores (not a panacea) 
What is Hardware Security? 
•  Interfaces [Schaumont 2009] 
–  Secure hardware is part of a bigger system. 
–  Secure hardware interfaces are tricky: 
•  How do you distinguish red wires from black wires?  
–  Secure hardware interfaces do not exist yet!  
–  Current secure hardware serves software 
•  Composition [Schaumont 2009] 
–  This is not trivial.  
–  To resist side channels, you must avoid redundancy.  
–  However, fault tolerance requires increasing redundancy.  
–  How can you build fault-tolerant, side channel resistant systems? 
•  Metrics [Schaumont 2009] 
–  Security is dimensionless.  
–  Metrics are absolutely necessary to do meaningful research. 
–  Without metrics, it is impossible to analyze trade-offs. 
•  Education: Electrical Engineers are trained to make things happen 
rather than to make bad things NOT happen [Schaumont 2009] 
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Tradeoffs	  
•  SoWware	  vs.	  Hardware	  
– Generality	  vs.	  performance	  
– FPGAs	  are	  in	  between	  




–  IP	  is	  vulnerable	  in	  overseas	  foundries	  
– Reduce	  problem	  of	  trusKng	  foundry	  to	  problem	  of	  
trusKng	  FPGA	  
CPU	   ASIC	  FPGA	  
General-­‐Purpose	   ApplicaKon-­‐Specific	  
OpKon	  0?	  
•  Running	  soWware	  on	  a	  CPU	  
– SoWware	  is	  loaded	  onto	  the	  CPU	  in	  a	  secure	  
facility	  aWer	  fabricaKon	  
•  Coprocessor	  
– One	  chip	  is	  manufactured	  in	  a	  trusted	  foundry;	  
the	  other	  in	  an	  overseas	  foundry	  
– The	  two	  reside	  on	  the	  same	  circuit	  board	  
Reconfigurable	  Hardware	  


















































Trusted	  Design	  in	  FPGAs	  
•  Source:	  [Trimberger	  2007]	  





Figure 1.  FPGA Component Flow 
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2D	  Split	  Manufacturing	  
•  Design	  in	  the	  US	  
•  Fabricate	  through	  the	  first	  or	  second	  metal	  
layer	  at	  an	  insecure	  facility	  
•  Finish	  the	  metal	  layers	  2	  through	  12	  in	  a	  
trusted	  facility	  
2D	  Split	  Manufacturing	  
•  To	  achieve	  this,	  the	  IARPA	  TIC	  Program	  will	  
use	  a	  FEOL	  and	  BEOL	  set	  of	  processes	  
– FEOL	  =	  Front	  End	  of	  Line	  
– BEOL	  =	  Back	  End	  of	  Line	  
•  The	  final	  ASIC	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  combined	  
FEOL	  and	  BEOL	  processes	  
2D	  Split	  Manufacturing	  
•  QuesKons	  
– What	  is	  the	  interface?	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[Koyanagi05] 
•    Merits of 3D LSI
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Wafer bonding (NEC * Nakamura)
SOI (Wafer bonding) (Hughes)
SOI (Smart Cut) (Latti)
CMP (IBM)
Damascene Cu wiring (IBM)
3-D IC National Project (1981-1990) (Japan)
Laser anneal 3-D (Mitsubishi)
Wafer bonding 3-D (Transfer) (NEC)
Wafer bonding 3-D (Non-transfer) (Tohoku Univ.)
Wafer bonding 3-D (Buried interconnection) (Tohoku Univ.)
Wafer/Chip bonding 3-D (Tohoku Univ., Fraunhofer)
Wafer bonding 3-D (SOI) (Motorola, etc.)
ASET Project (1999~2003) (Japan)
Wafer bonding 3-D (Cu bonding) (RPI etc.)
Chip bonding 3-D
a-Si/Poly-Si 3-D (Stanford Univ., Matrix Semi.)
Wafer bonding 3-D (SOI) (IBM)
Alternative 3-D Approaches 
•  PoP [Lim10] 
Wire Bonding (SiP) [Amkor09]	  
Alternative 3-D Approaches 
•  PoP [Lim10] 
Alternative 3-D Approaches 
•  [Amkor10] 
Application Specific Package Roadmaps
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Examples of 3-D Systems 




































Only 4 vertical links
shown here for clarity
Vertical links
coming out of
paper (up to 25,
for a 5x5
crossbar)
Examples of 3-D Systems 










Examples of 3-D Systems 
•  Particle Physics [Demarteau09] 
Examples of 3-D Systems 
•  Chip Scale Camera Module [Yoshikawa09] 
Examples of 3-D Systems 
•  3D-PIC 3-D CMOS Imager [Chang10] 
Examples of 3-D Systems 
•  3-D Stacked Retinal Chip [Kaiho09] 
Examples of 3-D Systems 
•  3-D Stacked Retinal Chip [Koyanagi05] 
Medical	  Image	  Processing	  
•  [Cong	  2011]	  
Examples of 3-D Systems 
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Examples of 3-D Systems 
•  3D-MAPS: Many-core 3-D Processor with 
Stacked Memory [Lim10] 























Some	  Data	  on	  3D	  
•  [Kim	  2012]	  64	  CPU	  cores	  joined	  with	  256K	  of	  SRAM:	  63.8GB/s	  memory	  bandwidth	  
•  [Yoshikawa	  2009]	  CMOS	  image	  sensor:	  55%	  reducKon	  in	  volume	  and	  36%	  
reducKon	  in	  footprint	  
•  [Loh	  2007]	  3D	  floor	  plan	  for	  PenKum	  4:	  15%	  improvement	  in	  performance	  and	  
power;	  10.3%	  improvement	  in	  clock	  frequency	  for	  Alpha	  21364;	  3D	  version	  of	  
dynamic	  non-­‐uniform	  cache	  architecture	  reduces	  L2	  access	  Kme	  by	  50%;	  3D	  
stacking	  can	  allow	  the	  cache	  size	  to	  increase,	  reducing	  average	  memory	  access	  
latency	  by	  13%	  and	  reducing	  off-­‐chip	  bandwidth	  by	  3x	  
•  [Black	  2006]	  3D	  stacked	  DRAM	  cache	  can	  reduce	  cycles	  per	  memory	  access	  by	  13%	  
on	  average	  and	  by	  as	  much	  as	  55%	  while	  reducing	  off-­‐chip	  bandwidth	  and	  power	  
by	  55%	  
•  [Loh	  2008]	  OpKmizaKons	  to	  3D	  DRAM	  that	  result	  in	  1.75x	  speedup	  over	  prior	  3D-­‐
DRAM	  approaches;	  L2	  miss	  handling	  architecture	  that	  achieves	  an	  extra	  17.8%	  
performance	  improvement	  
•  [Pubaswamy	  2005]	  3D-­‐parKKoned	  cache	  can	  reduce	  latency	  by	  21.5%,	  reduce	  
energy	  consumpKon	  by	  30.9%,	  and	  increase	  IPC	  by	  12%.	  
What is 3Dsec? 
•  Economics of High Assurance 
–  High NRE Cost, Low Volume 
–  Gap between DoD and Commercial 
•  Disentangle security from the COTS 
–  Use a separate chip for security 
–  Use 3-D Integration to combine: 
•  3-D Control Plane 
•  Computation Plane 
–  Need to add posts to the COTS chip design 
•  Dual use of computation plane 
Trustworthy System Security through 




















Silicon	  Layer	  2	  
Silicon	  Layer	  1	  
Goal: Build trustworthy systems using 
commercial hardware components 
Problem: Integrating specialized security 
mechanisms is too costly for hardware 
vendors 
Idea: Augment commodity hardware after 
fabrication with a separate layer of security 
circuitry  
 
Anticipated Benefits:  
Configurable, protected, low-cost hardware 
security controls that can override activity in 
the commodity hardware 
Privacy Applications: 
Detect and intercept the execution of 
malicious code 
Prevent the microprocessor internals from 
being exploited to leak crypto keys 
Tag and Track private information as it flows 
through a processor 
Pro’s and Con’s 
•  Why not use a co-processor? On-chip? 
•  Pro’s 
–  High bandwidth and low latency 
–  Controlled lineage 
–  Direct access to internal structures 
•  Con’s 
–  Thermal and cooling 
–  Design and testing 
–  Manufacturing yield 
Cost 
•  Cost of fabricating systems with 3-D 
–  Fabricating and testing the security layer 
–  Bonding it to the host layer 
–  Fabricating the vias 
–  Testing the joined unit 
Circuit-Level Modifications 





3-D Application Classes 
•  Enhancement of native functions 
•  Secure alternate service 
•  Isolation and protection 
•  Passive monitoring 
–  Information flow tracking 
–  Runtime correctness checks 
–  Runtime security auditing 
Self-Protection and Dependency 
Layering 
•  Can a 3-D control plane provide useful 
secure services when it is conjoined with an 
untrustworthy computation plane? 
•  Yes, provided: 
–  Self-protection 
–  Dependency Layering 
•  Applies to overseas foundry 
–  Option 1: FPGA fabric 
–  Option 2: FEOL layer(s) 
–  Option 3: computation plane 
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Conclusions	  
•  OpKon	  1	  
– Design	  never	  goes	  to	  foundry	  
– Simple	  and	  inexpensive	  
– Bit-­‐stream	  decrypKon	  mechanism	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  
side	  channel	  aback	  on	  fielded	  device.	  
– CauKon:	  Abacker	  can	  cause	  serious	  harm	  by	  
modifying	  the	  FPGA	  fabric	  even	  without	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  final	  design	  to	  be	  loaded	  onto	  
the	  FPGA	  
Conclusions	  
•  OpKon	  2	  
– Only	  BEOL	  knows	  connecKons	  between	  devices	  
made	  in	  FEOL	  stage	  
– What	  is	  the	  interface	  between	  FEOL,	  BEOL?	  
– Cost?	  Complexity?	  Feasibility?	  
– CauKon:	  Abacker	  can	  cause	  serious	  harm	  by	  
modifying	  FEOL	  layer(s)	  even	  without	  knowledge	  
of	  BEOL	  layers.	  
Conclusions	  
•  OpKon	  3	  
– ComputaKon	  plane	  manufactured	  in	  untrusted	  
foundry,	  control	  plane	  manufactured	  in	  trusted	  
foundry	  
– CauKon:	  abacker	  can	  cause	  harm	  by	  modifying	  
computaKon	  plane	  even	  without	  knowledge	  of	  
control	  plane.	  
Conclusions	  
•  OpKon	  3	  
– 3D	  probing	  for	  tesKng	  purposes	  is	  harder	  for	  3D	  
than	  for	  2D	  
–  It	  is	  not	  trivial	  to	  chemically	  remove	  package	  of	  
3DIC,	  break	  bond	  between	  Kers,	  and	  tap	  the	  TSVs	  
– Tiers	  are	  Kghtly	  bonded	  and	  have	  no	  exposed	  
shared	  buses	  or	  I/O	  pins	  
– Future	  work:	  secure	  protocols	  between	  Kers	  
Conclusions	  
•  OpKon	  2	  vs.	  OpKon	  3	  
–  Both	  are	  challenging.	  What	  is	  the	  interface?	  
–  OpKon	  2:	  Can	  we	  depend	  on	  untrusted	  FEOL	  devices?	  
Can	  we	  protect	  ourselves	  from	  them?	  Can	  same	  FEOL	  
wafer	  design	  be	  used	  for	  many	  different	  BEOL	  
designs?	  Can	  we	  tap,	  override,	  disable,	  reroute,	  etc.?	  
Can	  we	  decouple	  security	  and	  non-­‐security	  
funcKonality?	  
–  OpKon	  3:	  Can	  we	  use	  untrusted	  computaKon	  plane?	  
Can	  we	  protect	  ourselves	  from	  them?	  Can	  same	  
computaKon	  plane	  be	  used	  with	  many	  different	  
control	  planes	  (or	  alone)?	  
Split	  Manufacturing	  
•  Discussion	  Points	  
–  Can	  we	  trust	  the	  result	  of	  split	  manufacturing?	  
–  Could	  this	  approach	  harm	  security?	  
–  What	  are	  the	  challenges	  of	  2D?	  
–  What	  are	  the	  challenges	  of	  3D?	  
–  Is	  it	  worth	  it?	  When	  is	  it	  worth	  it?	  
–  Why	  not	  use	  trusted	  foundry	  always?	  
–  Are	  trusted	  foundries	  a	  band	  aid	  soluKon	  to	  offshoring	  
trend?	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